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Abstract. In this paper, a concept of approximate social Nash equilibria is con-
sidered and an existence result is given when the strategic spaces of the players
are not compact. These have been obtained using an approximate ¯xed point
theorem. As an application of the existence of such approximate social Nash equi-
libria, su±cient conditions for the existence of a suitable approximate walrasian
equilibrium in ¯nite economies are obtained. Among others things, it is shown that
the approximate walrasian equilibrium here considered is approximatively weakly
e±cient.
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11 Introduction
In the framework of ¯nite exchange economies, the closedness of the sets of
consumption bundles has played a crucial role in order to obtain su±cient
conditions for the existence of walrasian equilibria (see, for example, [6], [7],
[10]). When the consumption sets are not closed, even if an exchange econ-
omy has continuous and convex preferences, walrasian equilibria may not
exist. Moreover, an economy may have not walrasian equilibria also when
the preferences are not convex and the consumption sets are closed. So, in-
teresting can be concepts of approximate walrasian equilibria.
Several works have been devoted to concepts of approximate equilibria for
exchange economies with a ¯nite number of goods and non necessarily convex
preferences. There, existence results have been obtained when the consump-
tion sets coincide with the (closed) positive orthant (see, for example, [16],
[9], [1], [2]).
In this paper, in order to investigate free disposal exchange economies with
bounded and non closed consumption sets and with convex preferences, a
concept of approximate walrasian equilibrium is considered. This concept
deals with pairs of prices and allocations such that any consumer gets an ap-
proximation of his "Utility Maximization Problem" over a "trimmed" budget
set and the lost power of purchase of any consumer is "small enough". An
existence result is obtained using approximate ¯xed point arguments (as con-
sidered in [5]) and a suitable approximate social Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
such an approximate walrasian equilibrium satis¯es an approximate weakly
e±ciency condition.
The paper is planned as follows. In Section 2, a concept of approximate
walrasian equilibrium is presented and it is shown that it is approximatively
weakly e±cient and that a converging sequence of approximate equilibria con-
verges to an exact equilibrium whenever the approximations are converging
to zero. Section 3 presents a concept of approximate social Nash equilibrium,
together with su±cient conditions for its existence. Using an approximate
¯xed point theorem ([5]), these are obtained when the strategic spaces are
not closed and totally bounded subsets of real Banach spaces. Finally, in
Section 4, with the aid of the results of Section 3, su±cient conditions for
the existence of an approximate walrasian equilibria for economies with non
closed consumption sets are established.
22 An approximate walrasian equilibrium in
¯nite exchange economies
We are interested in a concept of approximate walrasian equilibrium for ¯nite
free disposal exchange economies having non closed consumption sets.
More precisely, let E = fXi;!i;ui = i 2 f1;:::;mgg be an exchange economy
(where m ¸ 2) with ` goods and m consumers (we remaind to [6] and [7] for
more details on the meaning of an exchange economy). For any consumer i,
Xi µ R` is the set of consumption bundles, ui is the utility function and !i
is the bundle of its initial endowment. Set ! =
Pm
i=1 !i (the total resource
of the economy), a tuple (x1;:::;xm) 2 X = "m
i=1Xi is said to be an allocation
if
Pm
i=1 xi · ! (where · denotes the Pareto order relation). Now, given
(x1;:::;xm) 2 X and a vector p 2 R`
+ of prices, the system (p;(x1;:::;xm))
is said to be a free-disposal walrasian (or competitive) equilibrium ([6], [7],
[10]) if (x1;:::;xm) is an allocation and:
for all i 2 f1;:::;mg, p ¢ xi · p ¢ !i and ui(xi) ¸ ui(zi) for any
zi 2 Xi such that p ¢ zi · p ¢ !i :
In order to have su±cient conditions for the existence of walrasian equilibria,
a central role has been played by the closedness of the sets X1;:::;Xm (see, for
example, [6], [7], [10]). Now, an economy may not have walrasian equilibria
when X1;:::;Xm are not closed sets. So, when these sets are not closed,
useful can be concepts of approximate walrasian equilibrium, as considered
in the next de¯nition where the approximation is on both levels of utilities
and power of purchase.
De¯nition 2.1 Let " be a positive real number. An allocation (x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)
is said to be an "-walrasian allocation if there exist a prices vector p¤ and
m positive real numbers º1;:::;ºm (called associated trimmed budgets) such
that:
i) for all i 2 f1;:::;mg: ºi · p¤¢!i, p¤¢x¤
i · p¤¢!i and ui(x¤
i) ¸ ui(xi)¡"





i=1 ºi · "
The tuple (p¤;(x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)) is called "-walrasian equilibrium.
If (x¤
1;:::;x¤
m) is an "-walrasian allocation, the consumer i asks the bundle
x¤
i which is an "-maximizer of the utility ui on the "trimmed" budget set
fxi 2 Xi = p¤ ¢ xi · ºig and he is able to ask x¤
i since p¤ ¢ x¤
i · p¤ ¢ !i.
Moreover, the part of the value of the total resource of the economy (with
3respect to the price vector p¤) which is lost, it is not greater than ".
In Section4 it will be given su±cient conditions for the existence of such
"-walrasian equilibria.
Remark 2.1 Note that if (p¤;(x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)) is an "-walrasian equilibrium (with
the associated trimmed budgets º1;:::;ºm) and if ¸ is a positive real number,
set p0 = ¸p¤, the list (p0;(x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)) is still an "-walrasian equilibrium (with
the associated trimmed budgets ¸º1;:::;¸ºm) whenever ¸ < 1. If ¸ > 1,
(p0;(x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)) is an ¸"-walrasian equilibrium.
As an exact walrasian allocation in a free disposal economy is weakly e±-
cient (see, for example, [7], [10]), an "-walrasian allocation is approximatively
weakly e±cient (if the value of the total resource of the economy is not
"too small") in the following sense, which is an extension of the concept of
approximate e±ciency1 considered in [14] and in [15].
De¯nition 2.2 Let " > 0. An allocation (x1;:::;xm) is said to be "-weakly
e±cient if there are not allocations (y1;:::;ym) such that the following holds:
i)
Pm
i=1 yi · (1 ¡ ")
Pm
i=1 !i
ii) ui(yi) > ui(xi) + " 8 i 2 f1;:::;mg :
Proposition 2.1 Let (p¤;(x¤
1;:::;x¤
m)) be an "-walrasian equilibrium and let
p¤ ¢
Pm
i=1 !i ¸ 1. Then, the allocation (x¤
1;:::;x¤
m) is "-weakly e±cient.
Proof. Assume that (x¤
1;:::;x¤
m) is not "-weakly e±cient and let º1;:::;ºm
be the associated trimmed budgets. So, there exists an allocation (y1;:::;ym)
such that i) and ii) in De¯nition 2.2 hold. In light of i) one has (1 ¡ ") p¤ ¢ Pm
i=1 !i ¸ p¤ ¢
Pm
i=1 yi; in light of ii) one has p¤ ¢yi > ºi for all i 2 f1;:::;mg.
So, it results:





















!i < " ;
which is a contradiction. 2
1An allocation (x1;:::;xm) is said to be "-e±cient (see [14] and [15]) if, given a list of






4Finally, as shown by the following proposition, we observe that a converg-
ing sequence of approximate walrasian equilibria converges to a walrasian
equilibrium if the approximations are converging to zero.
Proposition 2.2 Assume that the utility functions of the consumers are
continuous and, for all i, Xi is convex and all p 2 R`
+, there exists zi 2 Xi
such that p¢zi < p¢!i. Let "n ¡! 0+. If (pn;(xn
1;:::;xn




+£X such that, for all n, (pn;(xn
1;:::;xn
m)) is
an "n-walrasian equilibrium, then (po;(xo
1;:::;xo
m)) is a walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. For any n, there exist positive real numbers ºn
1;:::;ºn
m such that, for
all i 2 f1;:::;mg and all n:
(i) pn ¢ xn
i · pn ¢ !i and ºn
i · pn ¢ !i
(ii) ui(xn








Being 0 < ºn
i · pn¢!i for all n and all i, it follows that (ºn
i )n is bounded and
so it admits a converging subsequence. For sake of simplicity, we assume that
(ºn
i )n is converging to ºo






So, in light of the second of (i), it results ºo
i = po ¢ !i for all i. Now, the
set-valued function
Ki : (p;º) 2 R
`
+ £ R+ ¡! fzi 2 Xi = p ¢ zi · ºg
is lower semicontinuous at (po;ºo
i ). So, taken zi 2 Ki(po;ºo
i ), there exists a
sequence (zn
i )n converging to zi such that zn
i 2 Ki(pn;ºn
i ) for n su±ciently
large. Finally, in light of the continuity of utilities, the thesis follows from
(ii). 2
3 An approximate social Nash equilibrium in
abstract economies
Let m > 1 be an integer. For any i 2 f1;:::;mg, let Yi be a non-empty set,
fi be a real valued function de¯ned on Y = "m
j=1Yj and Ki be a set-valued
function from Y¡i = "j6=iYj to Yi. The list of data ¡ = fYi;Ki;fi = i 2
f1;:::;mgg is said to be an abstract economy ([6]), also called pseudo-game















¡i) 8 i 2 f1;:::;mg:
5When Ki(y¡i) = Yi for all y¡i 2 Y¡i and all i 2 f1;:::;mg, a social Nash
equilibrium is nothing but a Nash equilibrium ([12], [13]).
Suppose that the set-valued functions K1;:::;Km are described by inequali-
ties: for any player i there exists a function gi : Y ¡! R (called constraint
function) such that:
Ki(y¡i) = fyi 2 Yi = gi(yi;y¡i) · 0g for all y¡i 2 Y¡i (1)
Moreover, for any positive real number ¾ and any y¡i 2 Y¡i, we set K¾
i (y¡i) =
fyi 2 Yi / gi(yi;y¡i) · ¾g.
De¯nition 3.1 Let " and ¾ be two positive real numbers. A pro¯le of
strategies y¤ 2 Y is said to be an (";¾)-social Nash equilibrium of ¡ if the
















¡i) ¡ " :
Given y¤ an (";¾)-social Nash equilibrium, y¤
i is a strategy "close" to the set
of feasible strategies Ki(y¤
¡i) of the player i (under a continuity assumption
on gi) and it is such that i cannot improve the payo®s fi(y¤
i;y¤
¡i) with more
than " by unilateral deviations on Ki(y¤
¡i). Note that if Ki(y¡i) = Yi for
all y¡i 2 Y¡i and all i 2 f1;:::;mg, the approximate social Nash equilibria
by De¯nition 3.1 coincides with the classical approximate Nash equilibria for
games in strategic form2.
The set of (";¾)-social Nash equilibria of ¡ coincides with the set of ¯xed
points of the following (";¾)-aggregate best response set-valued function B(";¾):
B




i (y¡i) 2 2
Y












In order to use classical ¯xed point theorems to obtain the existence of (";¾)-
social Nash equilibria, among others assumptions, one has to consider com-
pact strategic spaces. Now, using approximate ¯xed point theorems (see [17]
2Let ¡ = fY1;:::;Ym;f1;:::;fmg be a game in strategic form and " > 0. A pro¯le of
strategies y¤ is said to be an "-Nash equilibrium if fi(y¤) + " ¸ fi(yi;y¤
¡i) for any yi 2 Yi
and any i 2 f1;:::;mg.
6and [5]), it is possible to obtain the existence of ¯xed points of B(";¾) without
compactness assumptions on the strategic spaces. In fact, in the same spirit
of [5] (see the "Key Proposition"), under extra continuity assumptions on
payo® and constraint functions, some ±-¯xed point3 of the set-valued func-
tion B("=2;¾=2) is also an (";¾)-social Nash equilibrium. The next theorem
presents su±cient conditions for the existence of (";¾)-social Nash equilibria
of abstract economies having non closed subsets of real Banach spaces as
strategic sets.
Theorem 3.1 Let ¡ = fYi;Ki;fi = i 2 f1;:::;mgg be an abstract economy,
where Y1;:::;Ym are convex and totally bounded subsets, with non empty in-
terior, of real Banach spaces. Let the constraints K1;:::;Km be described by
(1) with the functions g1;:::;gm respectively. Assume that the following is
satis¯ed for all i 2 f1;:::;mg:
(i) the payo® function fi and the constraint function gi are uniformly con-
tinuous on Y with respect to the norm k ¢ kY=
Pm
j=1 k ¢ kYj;
(ii) the function fi(¢;y¡i) is quasi-concave on Yi for any y¡i 2 Y¡i;
(iii) for any y¡i 2 Y¡i, there exists yi 2 Yi such that gi(yi;y¡i) < 0;
(iv) the function gi(¢;y¡i) is strictly quasi-convex4 on Yi for all y¡i 2 Y¡i.
Then, for any ";¾ > 0, ¡ has at least an (";¾)-social Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let " and ¾ be positive real numbers. First, we prove that B("=2;¾=2)
is a closed set-valued function with non-empty and convex values.
It is easy to prove that B("=2;¾=2) has non-empty and convex values (note that
since fi is uniformly continuous on Y totally bounded, then it is a bounded
function). To prove that B("=2;¾=2) is a closed set-valued function, we show
that the set-valued function B
("=2;¾=2)
i , de¯ned on Y¡i by (2), is closed for all
i. Let (yn
¡i)n be a sequence converging to y¡i and let (yn
i )n be a sequence















¡i) ¡ "=2 for n su±ciently large. (3)
3If F : Y ¡! 2Y and (Y;d) is a metric space, taken ± > 0, a point y 2 Y is said to be a
±-¯xed point of F (see, for example, [17] and [5]) if d(y;F(y)) = inffd(y;z) = z 2 F(y)g · ±.
4A function h : C ¡! R, where C is a non-empty and convex subset of a vector space,
is said to be strictly quasi-convex (see, for example, [3]) if for any c1;c2 2 C such that
h(c1) 6= h(c2) and any t 2]0;1[, it results h((1 ¡ t)c1 + tc2) < maxfh(c1);h(c2)g.
7In light of [11], Corollary 3.3.1, from (i), (iii) and (iv), it follows that the
set-valued function Ki is lower semicontinuous. So, in light of [4], Theorem












¡i) ¡ "=2 ¸ sup
zi2Ki(y¡i)
fi(zi;y¡i) ¡ "=2 :
Moreover, since gi(yn
i ;yn
¡i) · ¾=2, it follows gi(yi;y¡i) · ¾=2, that is yi 2
K
¾=2
i (y¡i). So, B
("=2;¾=2)
i is a closed set-valued function with non-empty and
convex values for all i and in light of [5], Theorem 2.35, there exist ±-¯xed
points of B("=2;¾=2) for any ± > 0.
Since the payo® and constraint functions are uniformly continuous on Y ,
given " > 0 and ¾ > 0, there exists ± > 0 such that for any y;z 2 Y with
k y ¡ z k< ±, it results
fi(yi;y¡i) ¸ fi(zi;z¡i) ¡ "=2 and gi(yi;y¡i) · gi(zi;z¡i) + ¾=2 (4)
for all i 2 f1;:::;mg.
Taken y¤ a ±=2-¯xed point of B("=2;¾=2), there exists ^ y 2 B("=2;¾=2)(y¤) such








¡i) ¡ "=2 and gi(^ yi;y
¤
¡i) · ¾=2 (5)















for all i 2 f1;:::;mg, which means that y¤ is an (";¾)-social Nash equilibrium
of ¡. 2
Remark 3.1 Note that if Ki(y¡i) = Yi for any y¡i 2 Y¡i and any i 2
f1;:::;mg, the hypothesis on the strategic spaces and on the payo®s functions
in Theorem 3.1 are su±cient conditions for the existence of approximate Nash
equilibria.
5[5], Theorem 2.3. Let E be a real Banach space and let Y be a convex and totally
bounded subset of E with non-empty interior. Assume that F : Y ¡! 2Y is a closed
set-valued function with non-empty and convex values. Then F has ±-¯xed points for any
± > 0.
8Remark 3.2 Assume that the payo® and constraint functions are continu-
ous and that the hypothesis (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 3.1 are satis¯ed. Let
"n ¡! 0+, ¾n ¡! 0+ and (yn)n be a sequence such that yn is an ("n;¾n)-
social Nash quilibrium of ¡ for all n. It is easy to prove that if yn ¡! yo,
then yo is a social Nash equilibrium of ¡.
Remark 3.3 In order to obtain su±cient conditions for the existence of
(";¾)-social Nash equilibria, the assumptions of uniform continuity on the
payo® and constraint functions in Theorem 3.1 cannot be relaxed in only
continuity assumptions. In fact, Example 3.1 considers a game without ap-
proximate Nash equilibria but with bounded strategic sets and continuous
payo®s.
Example 3.1 Let ¡ = fY1;Y2;f1;f2g be the game with Y1 = Y2 =]0;1[ and




and f2(y1;y2) = ¡
y2
1 ¡ y1
The functions f1 and f2 are continuous but not uniformly continuous on
]0;1[£]0;1[ and ¡ has not "-Nash equilibria for any " 2]0;1[. In fact, ¯xed
" 2]0;1[, the set of all "-Nash equilibria coincides with the set of ¯xed points

















Now, for all (y1;y2) 2]0;1[£]0;1[, it results
B
"
1(y2) = [1 ¡ y2 ";1[ and B
"
2(y1) =]0;(1 ¡ y1) "]:
So, one can verify that B" has not ¯xed points on ]0;1[£]0;1[.
The next example considers a game with totally bounded strategic sets (in
real Banach spaces), which has approximate Nash equilibria but not Nash
equilibria.
Example 3.2 Let ¡ = fY1;Y2;f1;f2g be the game in which Y1 = Y2 = Y
is a convex and totally bounded subset, with non-empty interior, of a real
9Banach space E. Assume that Y is not closed and 0 2 Y nY . The payo®s
are de¯ned on Y1 £ Y2 as follows:





















So, ¡ does not have Nash equilibria. Since the functions f1 and f2 are
uniformly continuous on Y1 £Y2 and they satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem
3.1, ¡ has at least an "-Nash equilibrium for any " > 0.
4 Existence of an approximate walrasian
equilibrium
In the next theorem, su±cient conditions for the existence of the "-walrasian
equilibria considered in De¯nition 2.1 are given.
Theorem 4.1 Let E = fXi;!i;ui = i 2 f1;:::;mgg (m > 1) be an exchange
economy, where X1;:::;Xm are bounded and convex subsets of R` with non-
empty interior. Assume that for all i 2 f1;:::;mg, all p 2 R`
+ and all ± > 0,
there exists xi 2 Xi such that p ¢ xi < p ¢ !i ¡ ±. If ui is a quasi-concave and
uniformly continuous function on Xi, for any i, then there exists at least an
"-walrasian equilibrium, for all " > 0.
Proof. We proceed as follows. First, we construct an abstract economy ¡
whose approximate social Nash equilibria are also approximate competitive
equilibria of E. Then the thesis will be obtained applying Theorem 3.1.
Let " > 0 and ¹ !1;:::; ¹ !m such that ¹ !i = !i ¡ (1=m) " " " for all i 2 f1;:::;mg,
where " " " is the vector of R` whose components are equal to ". Let
¡ =
©
Yi;Ki;fi = i 2 f1;:::;m;m + 1g
ª
be the abstract economy de¯ned as following:
² Yi = Xi if i 2 f1;:::;mg and Ym+1 = fq 2 R`
+ = 1
m · q1 + ::: + q` · 1g;
10² Ki(p;y¡i) = fyi 2 Yi = p¢yi · p¢ ¹ !ig for any (p;y¡i) 2 Ym+1 £Y¡i and
for any i 2 f1;:::;mg;
² Km+1(y) = fp 2 Ym+1 =
P`
k=1 pk ¡ 1 · 0g;
² fi(p;y) = ui(yi) for any (p;y) 2 Ym+1 £ Y and for any i 2 f1;:::;mg;
² fm+1(p;y) = p ¢
Pm
i=1(yi ¡ ¹ !i) for any (p;y) 2 Ym+1 £ Y ;
where Y = "m
i=1Yi and, for any i 2 f1;:::;mg, Y¡i = "j2f1;:::;mgnfigYj. We set
¾ = "=(2m2).
All hypothesis of Theorem 3.1 are satis¯ed. So, there exists an ("=2;¾)-social
Nash equilibrium (p¤;(x¤
1;:::;x¤












i) ¸ ui(xi) ¡
"
2
for all xi 2 Xi such that p
¤ ¢ xi · p
¤ ¢ ¹ !i :















i ¡ ¹ !i) ·
"
2




i¡¹ !i) · " " ", which implies that (x¤
1;:::;x¤
m) is an allocation
of the economy. Now, set ºi = p¤ ¢ ¹ !i for all i 2 f1;:::;mg, we obtain:
ui(x
¤
i) ¸ ui(xi) ¡ " for all xi such that p













(!i ¡ ¹ !i) = p
¤ ¢" " " · "
and the proof is concluded. 2
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